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CONTROLLING THE WORKERS:
THE GALVESTON DOCK WORKERS' STRIKE OF 1920
AND ITS IMPACT ON LABOR RELATIONS IN TEXAS

by William D.

Ange~

Jr.

On March 3, 1920, after months of futile negotiations with
coastwise shipping companies, sixteen hundred coastwise
longshoremen in Galveston struck the Morgan and Mallory steamship lines. Striking as part of nationwide walkout, they demanded
an hourly wage hike from $.60 to $.80 for straight time and from $.90
to $1.20 for overtime. Also, they wanted closed shop employment practices to continue on the Galveston docks, so only members ofthe International Longshoremen's Association (lLA) would be permitted to
work. 1
The strike, however, focused other issues, specifically the role that
unions would play in the modernization of the Texas economy. The
state's businessmen believed that a militant, class conscious, and
organized labor force would retard economic progress. As a group of
Vernon, Texas, businessmen put it; "Although we are friends of the
laboring man, self preservation and salvation from ruin demand that
walking delegates and agitators of all kinds be prevented from making a 'Russia' out of America."2 In a somewhat more sophisticated
vein, T.H. Coffee, president of the Vernon Chamber of Commerce,
stated that his organization only wanted to "secure maximum production in labor and eliminate all possible waste as the only means
of ... stabilizing conditions throughout the country.'" For Vernon's
leaders - and their views paralleled those of businessmen throughout
Texas - unions had to be controlled, their activities restricted.
During the period immediately following World War I, Texas
businessmen went about the work of affirming class relationships so
that owners and managers could dominate labor effectively. Together
with politicians, they established a work setting in which capitalist
enterprises would secure maximum productivity from their workers
without facing the limits imposed by slowdowns, strikes, or negotiations with unions.' Their aims included the establishment of openshop policy wherever unions attempted to organize labor. Although
many work stoppages and walkouts occurred in Texas both immediately before and after World War I, one of the most important
was the Galveston Dock Workers Strike of 1920. This case illustrates
the brutal willingness of private businessmen to ally with the state
to create open-shop working conditions, or, in other words, an at·
mosphere in which only a weak labor opposition would exist.
William D. Angel, Jr., is Assistant Professor ofPolitical Science, Ohio State University
at Lima..
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The Galveston City Commission generally sympathized with the
strikers and did not interfere with the local's activities. In fact, city
officials responded favorably to working class needs and interests.
The commissioners had been elected in 1919 as members of the "City
Party," whose platform advocated the abolition of sewer taxes, the
equalization of all property value assessments, and the raising oftaxes
on property owned by the Galveston Wharf Company.' Despite
vigorous opposition from such business groups as the Young Men's
Progressive League, the Galveston Commercial Association, and the
Galveston Merchants' Association, the city's voters approved these
reforms in a referendum election held in May 1920 - two months
after the beginning of the Dock Workers Strike.'
Thus, in the midst of the 1920 strike, Galveston capitalists felt
increasingly hard pressed by labor groups in the city and by a city
government unsympathetic to their needs. They were displeased with
the benevolent attitude that the city commissioners had displayed
toward the city's workers. They were also upset by the municipal
government's intention to undertake tax reform at their expense.
Their attitudes and their actions began to harden within a few days
fonowing the referendum.

1

l

On May 11, a brief flurry of violence affected the strike and stirred business' resolve. Someone fired gunshots at a group of railroad
cars transporting strike-breakers from the Mallory Docks to Houston.'
Although no one was harmed seriously and although it was never
proven that striking workers had fired the shots, the Galveston
business community exploited the incident to exaggerate the labor
troubles in Galveston. Speaking on behalf of the Galveston business
community, the Galveston Daily News editorialized: "It is sincerely
to be hoped that conservative leaders will step into the breach and
curb the intemperate actions of radicals, prevent possible serious riots,
and save their organization from possible blemish ... There have
been numerous affrays between pickets and strikebreakers and two
near riots. The protection afforded by the police has been almost a
nullity."8
On May 13, Mayor H.O. Sappington requested the deployment
of Texas Rangers to protect non-union workers on the docks." The
Rangers more than fulfilled this function, preventing union proselytiz.
ing as well as interference. On one occasion, armed Rangers drew
their pistols and dispersed two union organizers attempting to
distribute union literature at a strikebreakers' encampment." With
the Rangers in firm control, tranquility soon prevailed on the
Galveston waterfront. On May 20, Ranger Captain RW. Aldrich
reported to Governor William Hobby that "quiet orderliness" prevailed on the docks and that no striking dockworkers were attempting
to "subvert" working employees. 11
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Galveston businessmen, however, were less concerned about the
safety of the strikebreakers than they were fearful that local shipping companies would move to other ports. On May 12, the News had
warned of the potential calamity that would follow ifthe Mallory Line
relocated: "There will go with it many thousands of dollars paid out
in salaries and other disbursements. It is generally known that other
ports are making strong bids for the Mallory Line's business, and it
is now known that the Mallory Line officials are thoroughly
dissatisfied with Galveston affairs.""

A few days later, events began to confirm Galvestonians' concern.
Mallory announced the relocation of its headquarters and business
to Port Arthur, and the Morgan Line leaked word of a possible move
to New Orleans." J.B. Dennison, vice president and general manager
of the Mallory Line, announced:
The company has been forced to seek another port as its Texas

terminal due to the refusal ofthe strikers to accept the wage scale
offered them and their interference with other workers . .. For
this reason, we have moved our offices to Port Arthur, where we
have found the facilities excellent. Our vessels are being loaded

and discharged with dispatch and we are pleased with the results
obtained. 14

Later under questioning Dennison refused to state that the move was
only temporary. On May 28, the impact of Mallory's decision became
clear when 200 freight-filled rail cars were diverted from Galveston
to Port Arthur, "because of the longshoremen's strike" and because
of the availability in Port Arthur of "facilities for loading freight on
ships of the Mallory Steamship Company. "15
To make matters worse, Houston businessmen were actively
soliciting Mallory to build a terminal on the city's Ship Channel. In
fact, they tendered such an offer at a May 31 meeting which included representatives from the Houston Young Men's Business League,
the Salesmanship Club, the Houston Advertising Association, the
Automobile Association of South Texas, and the Retail Merchants
Association. Assured by B.C. Allin, director of the Port of Houston,
that "The Port can easily care for the Mallory Line," the meeting

approved a resolution urging the issuance of bonds to provide proper
facilities for the Mallory Company. One participant in the meeting
echoed a view which surely must have rattled the nerves of Galveston
businessmen: "The trouble with Galveston," he declared, "is that it
is a longshoremen's town, is run by longshoremen, and for that reason
no change in the present conditions [there] can be expected in the
near future. "10 Others announced the expectation that acquisition of
the Mallory Line would make Houston into a first-class world port,
something Houstonians had wanted ever since they had initiated the
ship channel project." Such sentiments coming from their greatest
rival made Galveston's businessmen sweat.
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Throughout June 1920, the Galveston Daily News complained that
striking longshoremen were restricting traffic at the Port of
Galveston. Although the Mallory Line had attempted to use non-union
workers to unload coastwise ships, the News pointed out that only
two such vessels were unloaded between March 19 and June 6. Fortytwo shipments of cargo normally would have been handled during
that period. Similarly, the Galveston paper noted, longshoremen on
the Morgan Docks should have unloaded sixty-six ships; by June 6,
only four ships had been unloaded. Also, according to the News,
Galveston's grain elevators were full and awaiting coastwise shipment, while 2600 carloads of wheat were stalled in shipyards because
no one would handle them."
Capitalists in Galveston and throughout the state used these
statistics to press for state intervention on their behalf. In Houston
H.C. Engle, spokesperson for the local Chamber of Commerce,
asserted: "The situation has become serious and something should
be done. We should have whatever steps are necessary to move the
goods now in Galveston, belonging to Houston shippers, and if protection cannot be had in Galveston, it can be obtained from the state
or Federal government ...."" From Dallas, T.E. Jackson, president
of that city's Chamber of Commerce, wired Governor William P. Hobby, "It is imperative to protect the interests of Texas shippers who
depend on Galveston for port facilities.""

I
l

The Board of Directors for the Texas Chamber of Commerce, at
the behest of merchants throughout the state, carried their appeal
directly to the Governor in a June 1 meeting with him. J.G. Culbertson from Wichita Falls, president of this organization, Louis Lipsitz
of Dallas, and H.H. Haines of Galveston all warned the Governor,
"Assaults of a violent nature ... have been an almost daily occurrence in Galveston to the great detriment of business interests in
Texas." Emphasizing that police protection in the Port was "inadequate," they further urged Governor Hobby to intervene and uphold
"the prestige of Texas Gulf ports."" Haines, who was president of
the Galveston Commercial Association, and three businessmen from
Galveston (H.A. Treat, John Jacobson, and Peter Cummings) advised Hobby that because commerce through the Port of Galveston was
"paralyzed," the Governor should "provide adequate protection to the
citizens of Texas in the Port of Galveston, even to the extend ofdeclar-

ing martial law."" In their appeals to Governor Hobby, each ofthese
capitalist groups indicated that workers who wanted to work were
being harrassed, while the local police force was making no attempt
to intervene. 23
Governor Hobby quickly responded, sending an ultimatum to
Sheriff Henry Thomas of Galveston County and to the Galveston
City Commission. Asserting that the strike was creating chaos in the
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Texas economy, the Governor warned: "I feel it is my duty to advise
you that unless police protection is given and the peace laws of the
state enforced by local authorities, ensuring the free and uninterrupted movement of freight and the absolute safety of any and all
workers employed in the loading, unloading, and transfer or transportation of same, I shall ... assume control."'"' Hobby then ordered State
Militia Brigadier General J.R. Wolters to Galveston to observe the
dock situation and to discuss possible remedies with local authorities
and businessmen. He also gave the militia commander the authority to "take such action as will be necessary to enforce the laws of
the state without partiality and to keep open these arteries of trade
which are essential to the prosperity and uninterrupted conduct of
business in Texas. "2~
Stung by these events, Galveston's commissioners contended that
Hobby, the Texas Chamber of Commerce, local businessmen, and
other business interests had grossly overstated the situation in
Galveston. They bristled at the Governor's implied threat to send the
militia to their city. Wiring him, they claimed that the local police
"would cope with and suppress" any violation of the law. Meanwhile
J.H. Fricke, president of the South Atlantic District of the International Longshoremen's Association (!LA), argued that the strike was
"the most peaceful and law abiding strike in history."" I.M. Barb,
president of the Galveston Labor Council, protested, "Governor Hobby's action is totally uncalled for. Those who went to Austin to lay
the matter before Governor Hobby represented the situation in as
black a light as possible. Gross misrepresentations were made by the
State Chamber of Commerce and by some of the union-hating citizens
of Galveston."2'l'
Although dock traffic was still ensnarled on June 7, cargo was
beginning to move and there appeared to be little need for outside
law enforcement. Even the Galveston Daily News reported, "There
is peace on the waterfront at Galveston now and the non-union men
are working undisturbed in increasing numbers. "28
This latter view appears to be more accurate than the exaggerated
interpretation of Governor Hobby and the version supplied by those
businessmen urging him to action. Commercial data suggest that
trade was proceeding through Galveston, despite the alleged problems
the Mallory and Morgan Lines were encountering. One must keep
in mind that the strike was among coastwise unions; deep sea
longshoremen were still handling cargos, even those shipments
destined for coastal ports. In May 1920, a total ofninty-eight vessels
cleared Galveston Port with $27.8 million in exported goods while
$3.2 million of goods were imported. In May 1919, one year earlier,
the export-import traffic was $27.5 and $2.1 million respectively."
These data hardly supports the charge that the strike was strangling
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Galveston's and Texas' commerce.

Hobby and Texas capitalists likewise distorted and exaggerated
the extent of physical abuse directed by the striking workers against
the strikebreakers. On June 3, H.M. Wilkins, agent for the Morgan
Line, reported to the contrary: "Large numbers of dock workers are
arriving daily, and today a great many came in voluntarily. Several
of our new dock workers who came in last week have returned to our
docks bringing large numbers of new workmen with them."" Work
continued on the Morgan docks, even though workers still required
an escort to get to work and the company continued to post guards
to prevent disruption.
On June 4, Adjutant General W.D. Cope met with Galveston's
commissioners and local labor leaders. J.H. Fricke, an !LA official,
eloquently tried to counter the reports of union violence, asserting
that "Our men believe in law and order and the records will show
that our members are law abiding citizens." Fricke went on to argue
that the imposition of martial law was unwarranted. "There is no
trouble here of any account," he claimed, "[and] the majority of the
people in the city do not even know there is a strike on. Except for
a few peaceful pickets, all men are kept away from the docks."" The
next day Cope, Mayor Sappington, and Ranger Captain Brooks
observed freight being loaded onto ships at Galveston wharves. Cope
wired Governor Hobby that "he saw additional workers on the Wharf
at work; that switchers were moving empty cars onto the wharf and
... loaded cars out." Furthermore, he expressed "satisfaction with
the ability of the mayor, the city government, and the police to handle the situation. "32
This "peace on the watefront" should have obviated any assistance
from the Governor, but Texas businessmen were interested in more
than simply subduing a gaggle of striking longshoremen. If the
longshoremen's unions could be suppressed, then similar control could
be exercised over other unionized employees. Pursuing a more profound objective than simply clearing the alleged commercial logjam
in Galveston, they also wanted to open the Island City to non-union
labor. To accomplish this aim, they would use the coercive power of
the state government, waiting as long as need be to achieve their
objective.
On June 2 - the day after its representatives met with Governor
Hobby - the Texas Chamber of Commerce and the Galveston
Chamber of Commerce issued a statement proclaiming the need for
the open shop:
The long continued succession of strikes in marine circles has tired
the business interests of Texas, affecting as it does the handling
of water-borne commerce so essential to the industrial life of the
state . .. Galveston has detern1ined to organize and operate an
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open shop policy on these coastwise docks as the only solution
to a serious and expensive obstruction of traffic and commerce. 33

F.O. Thompson, president of the Southwest Open Shop Association,
expressed sympathy for such a policy, declaring, "The only solution
to the strike is the establishment of the open shop ... Give us law
and order and we can bring in the open shop and put it in successful
operation."" Three days earlier, Thompson had met with several
Galveston businessmen to help organize a local open-shop association. 3S
To create conditions ripe for the open shop, however, capitalist
interests needed to secure the support of the Governor and the state
government. By this time businessmen in Galveston and throughout
Texas were distrustful of both the ILA and the Galveston authorities,
viewing them as collaborators in some scheme to wrest economic
power from the dominent business powers. The Galveston Commercial Association strongly articulated this view in a June 2 message
to the Governor:
We say to you unhesitatingly that we have no confidence in the
possibility of protection from Galveston police ... But the docks
must be opened. It is useless to make contracts with these unions;
they violate them as soon as they are made. The unions have no
property interests; they can not and will not make agreements
that are enforceable; and it is only folly to temporize with them.
Only from the State can we expect such measures of protection
as will enable us to operate. 36

The Commercial Association did not mince words about what actions
it expected from the state government. Declaring that the entire
state's interests were affected, the Association charged, "It would appear to be the state's job to furnish protection in whatever quantities
may be necessary, and to whatever extent, even to the extent of putting the city under martial law."" Thus, before they had even met
with Governor Hobby on June 4, capitalists in Galveston knew what
they wanted to accomplish and they were not about to allow any temporary "peace" on the Galveston docks to thwart their aims.
On June 7, Governor Hobby honored their pleas when he declared
martial law in Galveston and dispatched 1000 militiamen, including
two machine gun companies to the city." The next day, Galveston
businessmen announced the formation of an open shop association.
Responding to these events and to Hobby's order as attempts to
"establish the Open Shop in Galveston," labor leaders and city commissioners were incensed at the Governor's action. The shipping com·
panies reacted by bringing in over 200 additional non-union·workers
to unload cargos. 39
By June 13, most Galvestonians believed the Hcrisis" over; in
reality it was just beginning. Hobby declined to remove the troops,

,
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fearing that the situation at Galveston would "blow up immediately
if the troops left."" The volatile conditions, however, were largely
due to the shipping companies' exploitation of racial animosities.
Before the strike the Mallory Shipping Company had employed black
longshoremen and the Morgan Line had hired only whites. Shortly
after the strike began Mallory brought in white workers to replace
the striking black longshoremen, and Morgan hired blacks to work
the company's docks in place ofthe white unionmen." These attempts
to manipulate racial tensions generated little violence, as Fricke's
and Barb's remarks above indicate. Racial eruptions only occurred
when both shippers began to employ Mexican braceros as strikebreakers, at which time both white and black dock workers began
to harass the newcomers.
It was at this time that Governor Hobby declared martial law and
sent troops to control alleged violence on the docks. When the
longshoremen persisted in harassing the Mexican workers, Hobby
decided to prolong the troop deployment in order to protect "those
citizens of Galveston who wanted to work but who were being harassed by strikers."" But the violence that allegedly occurred in the
Galveston strike was not totally worker·inspired. Rather, the Mallory
and Morgan steamship companies' use of minority strike breakers
ignited racial conflict, thus giving Hobby the needed justification to
continue the troop deployment.
Not only did the soldiers remain, but in July the Governor sign·
ed an order which suspended and restrained Galveston's mayor and
commissioners "from performing their duties appertaining to their
respective offices with respect to enforcement of penal laws of the
State and the City of Galveston." His order also suspended all
members of the Galveston police force. Hobby declared this move was
required because Galveston officials had "failed to maintain and
preserve the peace and to protect the citizens engaged in lawful occupations.' '43

I

Galveston Commissioners A.P. Norman, V.L. Purcell, John Ger·
nand, and George Robinson, City Attorney Frank Anderson, and City
Judge Henry O'Dell jointly blasted the Governor's order: "The
whole situation is political, and martial law is for the avowed pur·
pose of establishing [the] open shop, destroying union labor, and taking over the city government."" Galveston officials believed they were
being punished because they had abolished "special privilege" and
had equalized taxes, a move which reportedly added $5.5 million to
city revenues. According to the city officials, the bulk of this increase
had come from "assessment against corporations, firms, an.d individuals which either [had] escaped taxation or where grossly under·
assessed.' '45
Despite this remonstration, Governor Hobby maintained martial

11--
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law in Galveston throughout the summer of 1920. Visiting Galveston
on the morning of July 21, he spoke privately with several city
businessmen, including J.B. Langben, president of the Galveston Dry
Dock and Commercial Association, and W.R. Phillips of the Galveston
Commercial Association. These conversations apparently hardened
the Governor's resolve. In a speech to the Rotary Club that very afternoon, he specified that he would not remove the troops until he had
an "absolute demonstration that Galveston can care for the situation." Furthermore, he argued, "I believe the life of Texas business
is involved in the existence of the port, and I will continue while in
the governor's office to use all powers vested in me in keeping the
port of Galveston open, in causing the movement of freight through
it ... "46
To local business interests, however, the phrase "keeping
Galveston open" signified more than simply allowing for the free
movement of trade. On July 31, thirteen cotton compress companies
turned down ILA demands for higher wages, shorter hours, and the
closed shop, proclaiming instead the existence of open-shop conditions
on company premises." A.S.L. Toombs of the Southern Products Company asserted, "When the contract expired, we decided to operate our
businesses as we saw fit, rather than have a walking delegate [Le.,
a union representative] in control of certain phases of it. Therefore,
we declined to make an agreement with any organization to exclusively supply us with workers."" In a similar move, steamship agents
refused to renew closed-shop contracts with locals of the Marine
Checkers Union. The Machinists Union and the Cooks and Waiters
Union received like treatment from their employers." By the fall of
1920, Galveston was becoming an open-shop city.
Two weeks later, steamship companies turned down a concession
offered by the striking longshoremen. The striking workers had
agreed to return to work, pending arbitration of their demands and
providing that the steamship owners dismissed non-union workers.'"
The steamship owners rejected this compromise because Galveston
docks were operating at seventy percent capacity, and with plenty
of non-union labor the companies saw little need to deal with the
unions. Also, if the companies dismissed the non-union workers in
favor of the union employees, it would imply de facto recognition of
the closed shop. The companies held firm, rejecting the concession."
Hobby's martial law policy thus allowed the local open-shop move·
ment to gain momentum.
The militia remained in Galveston until October 1920. Even after
the Governor restored the powers of the municipal officers, local law
enforcement remained under the supervision of the Texas Rangers. 52
By December 1920, the extensive "show of force" had subdued the
striking longshoremen. Mallory workers were the first to submit,
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accepting an hourly wage hike to $.67/hour, $1.00/hour for overtime.
According to the new contract, "No discrimination [would] be made
with respect to the employment of non-union workers." Thus, openshop conditions would prevail on Mallory Docks. Also, union representatives would not be permitted on the docks, "except in the performance of duty," and at no time would discussion of union activities
or business be allowed."
Again the companies tried to play the black and white workers
against each other, this time with considerably more success. They
induced the black Mallory longshoremen to sign this rather repressive
contract, and a few weeks later, the white Morgan workers, faced with
a fait d'acompl~ signed a similar agreement." By early 1921,
Galveston was essentially an open-shop city. Capital had forced a
devastating defeat upon labor.
The Galveston Dockworkers' Strike of 1920 - though not especially violent and costing only one life - was still noteworthy. The strike's
resolution established an atmosphere involving a tightly knit state
government/private business coalition, united in its opposition to
unionized labor. One ofthis coalition's intended objectives was to mold
the state into a "free-labor" territory, where new industries could
develop and where new factories could locate unfettered by the
perceived restrictions imposed by organized labor.
Having imposed its will on the Galveston Dockworkers, the coalition began to consolidate its gains once victory seemed assured. In
September 1920, Governor Hobby called a special session ofthe state
legislature "to consider the Galveston Strike situation..... He submitted an Open Port Bill for the legislature's consideration which
confirmed the Governor's right to declare martial law in cities where
strikes restricted the shipment of goods.
In a message to the legislators, Hobby declared: "The channels
of trade affecting the life of the business of Texas and affecting the
living conditions, the occupations of all the people, must be kept open,
and I shall exert the full limit of the state's power to accomplish that
purpose."" The bill made it "the policy ofthe state to effectively prohibit interference with those whose work is needed to carry on the
business of the port."" State Senator Page, whose rhetoric reflected
the views and beliefs of the measure's supporters, echoed support for
the Governor: "If you refuse to pass this bill, you are pandering to
the worst element in Texas. You are framing conditions so that we
may soon have Lenines [sic] and Trotszkys [sic] among us. This is not
a political matter, but a matter on which the good government ofthe
State of Texas is at stake."" The mood of the state legislature made
for speedy passage of the Open Port Bill, and the lawmakers overwhelmingly approved it on October 1920, the bill becoming law on
January I, 1921.'·
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The Open Port Act legitimized the right of the state government
to use its law enforcement powers to break up strikes, thwart union
activities, and preserve or establish open-shop practices. As such, its
passage sanctioned Governor Hobby's actions in the Galveston
Dockworkers' Strike. The act made it "unlawful for any two or more
persons to use physical violence or to threaten its use to interfere with
or protest or harass any persons engaged in the work of loading,
unloading, or transporting any commerce." Having application to
commerce on any common carrier, including railways, streetcar com·
panies, pipelines and wharf companies, the law also gave the Governor broad powers to "exercise full and complete jurisdiction" in any
areas where common carriers were being impeded. Because it was
a violation of the law to urge a common-earrier's employees to strike
while they were at work, the act straight-jacketed union efforts to
communicate with workers while on the job."
Two years later Governor Pat Neff invoked the Act to break the
1922 Railroad Strike. On July 1, 1922, members of the Federated
Railway Shopworkers Union in Houston stopped work in response
to a proposed reduction in their wage scale. Railworkers in Palestine,
Corpus Christi, San Antonio, Denison, Sherman, Waco, Childress,
Temple, Fort Worth, and other Texas cities followed suit." When the
Southern Pacific line fired striking workers and hired non-union
replacements, fist-fights and gunshot exchanges erupted in several
communities, most notably Denison, Childress, and Sherman. On July
26, Governor Neff, as authorized by the Open Port Law, declared martial law in Denison, where he deployed several companies of
state militia. Neff also dispatched Ranger detachments to Sherman,
Childress, Amarillo, Temple, Waco, Marshall, Cleburne, Lufkin, and
Kingsville."
By September 25, freight was once again moving freely, with both
the Texas and Pacific and Southern Pacific lines doing business as
usual. On October 2, the strike ended with a capitulation by the
workers. Not all of the striking workers were rehired; only those needed by the companies to share the workload with those non-union
employees hired during the strike were called back. Furthermore,
they returned to work at the reduced wage rate, as had been proposed in June, and they lost their seniority in the interim. They were
rehired only as "new employees."" Neff's application ofthe Open Port
Law forced a stunning defeat on Texas' striking railroaders.
The Texas government and the state's capitalists had once again
set an example for workers and for potential outside investors. They
had once again exercised their willingness to suppress organized labor
activity. In 1929 a Federal court ruled the Open Port Law unconstitutional as a violation of both the United States and the Texas Constitutions," but organized labor had already been taught a lesson.
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After all, Hobby had exercised the state's power without any law,
and conceivably future governors could do the same. The alliance between the state government and organized capital certainly could be
expected to deter any worker "uppityness" in Texas.
Another thought to consider is that Governors Hobby and Neff
were progressive governors when compared to the series of reactionary executives who followed them in the late 1930s, 1940s, and
1950s. W. Lee O'Daniel (1939-41), Coke Stevenson (1941-47), Benford
Jester (1947-49), and Allen Shivers (1949-57) all made it clear during their terms that unions were not welcome in Texas. Shivers,
especially, couched no sympathy for unions, and he heartily resisted
the CIO's repeated attempts to organize industrial workers in Texas.
He parlayed this anti-union stance into re-election victories in 1950,
1952 and 1954, primarily by labeling members of the CIO as communists, charges resembling those aimed at union members in 1920."
These later governors simply were operating in a political tradition consistent with that which existed in the 1920s. Hobby and Neff,
in cooperation with Texas businessmen, established a precedent which
these later, more reactionary governors, willingly exploited.
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